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Adler: National Security Information Under the Amended Freedom of Inform

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION UNDER
THE AMENDED FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND
ANALYSIS
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who
mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives. A popular government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.
James Madison'
Democratic self-government requires a free flow of information from the government to the people. The Freedom of Information Act 2 of 1966 recognized that the necessity for citizen access
to information must be balanced against the countervailing danger of breaching secrecy necessary to the national security. The
recent Vietnam, Watergate, and post-Watergate revelations,
however, have indicated that there are severe defects in this balance.
In October 1974, Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act, 3 in part to provide a more enlightened approach to the
disclosure of national security information. This article examines
the amendments in light of past attempts to penetrate the secrecy
surrounding our governmental institutions.
Part I reviews the basis for governmental withholding of national security information prior to the Freedom of Information
Act; part II examines the impact of the 1966 Act on the executive's privilege in this area; and part UI discusses the 1974
amendments to the Act.
I.

GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY PRIOR TO THE FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION ACT

Substantial growth in executive power began during the New
Deal and has continued through expansion of the federal administrative agencies established at that time. This power is derived
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
(G. Hunt ed. 1910), as quoted in S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-3 (1965).
2. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, codified by Act of June 5,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1971)).
3. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, amending 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1971) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 1975)).
JAMES MADISON 103
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in part from the vast storehouses of information under the agencies' virtually complete control. In general, the agencies have
denied public access to information the disclosure of which "in
their judgment . . . would, on public considerations, be inexpedient."'
Congressional sanction of executive nondisclosure began
with the housekeeping statutes. Enacted by the First Congress,
these statutes established the first executive departments and
gave each department head authority over department records.,
In 1873 these laws were consolidated into a single housekeeping
statute which provided that "[tihe head of each Department is
authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the . . . custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers,
and property appertaining to it." '
The public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act 7 was a more recent authorization of executive nondisclosure. It limited access "to the extent that there was involved...
any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public
interest"; information could be withheld "for good cause found,"
and could only be disclosed if the party seeking it was "properly
and directly concerned." 8
Until enactment of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966,
the courts were of negligible assistance to people seeking access
to information held by the executive branch. The judicial view
was that courts could not require disclosure when in the opinion
of the executive it would be contrary to the public interest.9 A
4. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, "Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government," 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 77 (1958). The hearings contain a history of executive refusals to furnish information
and papers which are deemed confidential. Id. at 63-146. See also 11 Op. ATr'y GEN. 137,
142-43 (1869) (by Attorney General Speed).
5. E.g., Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 4, 1 Stat. 29 (Dep't of Foreign Affairs, later called
the Dep't of State); Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (Dep't of the Treasury). Similar
statutes were passed for subsequently created departments. E.g., Act of April 30, 1798,
ch. 35, § 2, 1 Stat. 554 (Dep't of the Navy); Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 108, 9 Stat. 395
(Dep't of the Interior).
6. R.S. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1971) (corresponds to 5 U.S.C.
22 (1958)). Congress amended the Act in 1958 to limit its usefulness as a justification for
nondisclosure: "This section does not authorize withholding information from the public
or limiting the availability of records to the public." 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1971) (corresponds
to 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958)), formerly R.S. § 161 (1875).
7. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), as amended, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 1975).
8. Id.
9. See 40 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 45 (1941) (by Attorney General, later Mr. Justice Jackson).
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Supreme Court decision in 1900 was an early piece in the pattern
of judicial deference. In Boske v. Comingore,0 the Court reversed
a state court ruling which held an Internal Revenue collector in
contempt for refusing, based upon a departmental regulation, to
turn over certain reports in his custody. In the course of its opinion the Court commented upon the public's right of access to
information under government control:h"
[W]e do not perceive upon what ground the regulation in question can be regarded as inconsistent with law, unless it be that
the records and papers in the office of a collector of internal
revenue are at all times open of right to inspection and examination by the public, despite the wishes of the Department. That
cannot be admitted.
In general, secrecy has been premised upon historical practice
and constitutional directive, as well as upon congressional man2
date.
National Security Information
The executive's control over the flow of national security
information was nearly absolute until the amendment of the
Freedom of Information Act in 1974. In addition to a common
law, state-secrets privilege not to reveal matters concerning
strictly military and diplomatic affairs, 3 the judicial branch recognized an executive privilege of constitutional stature, 4 and
therefore refused to review any executive decision not to reveal
information claimed to be vital to the national security. 5 Support
for this approach lies in the President's power to conduct foreign
10. 177 U.S. 459 (1900).

11. Id. at 469; see In re SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955) (protecting a claim of
privilege pursuant to an agency rule); Universal Airline v. Eastern Air Lines, 188 F.2d 993,
999 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ("the right of administrative agencies to make reasonable regulations
regarding their records and reports").
12. See Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 273-74 (1971). See generally Younger,
CongressionalInvestigationand Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separationof Powers,
20 U. Pirr. L. REV. 755 (1959).
13. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953); Pollen v. Ford Instrument
Co., 26 F. Supp. 583, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 681
(1937); Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966).
14. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106-07
(1875).

15. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1875).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 7

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 1976]

affairs and in his duty to provide for the national defense. With
the exceptions of the power to declare war 6 and the power to bind
the United States in international treaties, 7 the Constitution
gives the President almost unbridled discretion in the related
areas of international relations and national defense.' 8 It is a short

step from this basic premise to the conclusion that control of
information in these sensitive areas should be, similarly, in the

hands of the executive:19
[I]t is elementary that the successful conduct of international
diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense
require both confidentiality and secrecy.
* , , If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree
of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the
maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary
to exercise that power successfully. .

.

. [I]t is the constitu-

tional duty of the Executive-as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law-through
the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to
protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense.
The concept that the President is privileged, without congressional authorization, to withhold national security information
the revelation of which he believes may be harmful to the national interest is not a recent addition to the law." Historically,
the privilege has been linked to the need for effective representa2
tion of the national interest in foreign affairs. '
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
17. Id. art. II, § 2.
18. Id.
19. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
20. See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). In one of the earliest
enunciations of this executive privilege, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's refusal to entertain an action against the federal government for compensation for services
alleged to have been rendered during the Civil War upon a contract for secret services
entered into between President Lincoln and the claimants' intestate. The Court held that
confidentiality was implied in all secret employments of the government "in time of war,
or upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the service might
compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties .... Id. at 106.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936):
"The nature of transactions with foreign nations ... requires caution and unity
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The doctrine of separation of powers precludes judicial review of executive action where such review requires the court to
perform a nonjudicial function. In defining the parameters of
2
such nonjudicial functions, the Supreme Court has stated:1
The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative-"the political"-Departments of the Government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp.,2 the Court extended those principles by nullifying a provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act 2 1 which authorized judicial review of decisions made by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Court
held that, despite the statutory authorization, it could not review
an order of the board which by the terms of the statute the President also had discretion to approve or reject:n
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts
sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences.
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature
of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. .

.

.They are and should be undertaken only by those

directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility and which has
long been held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch." U.S.
Senate Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, p. 24.

. ..[The President] has his confidential sources of information. He has
his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in
respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.
22. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); accord, Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1938).
23. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). The Civil Aeronautics Board, with express approval of the
President (as provided for by statute, Civil Aeronautics Act, § 801, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 1014
(1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. IV,1975)), denied Waterman Steamship a
certificate of convenience and necessity for an overseas air route, and granted one to
Chicago and Southern Air Lines, a rival applicant. The former sued.
24. Civil Aeronautics Act § 1006, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 1024 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1486 (1971).
25. Chicago Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
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Courts have traditionally carved out a small exception to the
broad constitutionally based executive privilege to withhold national security information. Where the claim of executive privilege conflicts with the judicial prerogative to control the nature
and scope of evidence presented, courts have asserted a degree of
authority. The classic statement of the limited review permissible
in such instances appears in United States v. Reynolds." In that
case, survivors of civilian observers killed in the crash of a military aircraft testing secret electronic equipment sued the United
States for negligence. The plaintiffs moved for production of the
Air Force's accident investigation report, including statements
made by surviving crew members during the investigation. The
Secretary of the Air Force filed a formal claim of privilege on the
ground that the aircraft and its personnel were engaged in a
highly secret mission and the material therefore could not be
furnished without seriously endangering the national security.
Noting that the privilege against revealing military secrets is well
established in the law of evidence,2 the Court held that the information was privileged. In strongly worded dictum, however,
the Court explained that in such cases it is the court itself which
must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for a
claim of privilege: 21 "Judicial control over the evidence in a case
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers." The
Court went on to suggest that in camera review of contested
materials to test the severability of innocuous portions from state
2
secrets might sometimes be proper or even necessary.
The potential of the Reynolds dictum for use as a springboard to change the law of privilege was never realized. The
heavy presumption against disclosure over claims of executive
privilege was the principal obstacle. The Government need only
show that there is a danger that disclosure would jeopardize the
national security since "[w]hen [a] formal claim of privilege
26. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953); accord, Heine v. Raus, 399
F.2d 785, 788 (4th Cir. 1968). The Court quoted an English decision for support:
"Although an objection . . . on the ground thai this would be injurious to the
public interest, is conclusive, it is important to remember that the decision
ruling out such documents is the decision of the judge. . . .It is the judge who
is in control of the trial, not the executive."
United States v. Reynolds, supra at 8 n.21, quoting Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co.
[19421 A.C. 624, 642.
29. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
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[is] filed . . . under circumstances indicating a reasonable possibility that military secrets [are] involved, there [is] certainly
a sufficient showing of privilege to cut off further demands for the
documents ... ."31 Thus, it appears that the very limited review
of security-related secrets recognized as appropriate by the
Reynolds Court was an aspect of judicial control of evidence,
rather than a product of the clash between executive secrecy and
a citizen's right to know.
This very limited review contrasts with the availability of in
camera inspection of documents, claimed to be privileged, but
not relating to national security matters. In United States v.
Nixon,3 ' for example, the Supreme Court has sanctioned such a
procedure where material is requested by a government prosecutor in the course of a criminal proceeding: 2
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the
argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished
by production of such material for in camera inspection with all
the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
Classification Under the Executive Orders
A significant manifestation of the executive's privilege to
withhold information was the promulgation of a series of executive orders 33 setting out standards for the classification of information in varying degrees. In what marked the beginning of the
"age of passionate classification," 4 President Truman issued
30. Id. at 10.

31. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
32. Id. at 706; accord, Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
33. Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. (1949-53 Comp.) 789 (1958); Exec. Order No.
10,501, 3 C.F.R. (1949-53 Comp.) 979 (1958); Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973),
as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,714, 3A C.F.R. 174 (1974). There is no express statutory
authority for these orders. Congress may have tacitly approved them through various acts
to protect the national security and through their incorporation in other laws. See, e.g.,
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1971); Espionage Laws, 18 U.S.C. §§
792-99 (1971); National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403(d)(3) (1971). See
generally Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 637 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The orders have also been justified on the basis of the President's powers as Commanderin-Chief. See COMMISSION

ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY, REPORT,

S. Doc. No. 64, 85th Cong.,

1st Sess. 158 (1957).
34. O'Neill, The Accessibility of Sources for the History of the Second World War:
The Archivist's Viewpoint, 1972 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES 25 (prologue). O'Neill
notes that as of 1972, over 200 million classified documents relating exclusively to World
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Executive Order No. 10,2901 in 1951. The Order was flawed by
imprecision in its definition of categories, unrestricted delegation
of authority to classify, and the absence of procedures for the
eventual declassification of material. The result was that mountains of classified material were created and declassification
rarely, if ever, occurred. 6
In 1953, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order No.
10,50111 which initiated the current system of classification. It
established three degrees of classification and provided graphic
examples of the type of information which would fall into each
category. 8 The Order thus lessened the classifying officers' discretion. Authority to classify was extended to any agency or department having either primary or partial responsibility for the
national defense.3 9 The Order contained a general admonition
against "[u]nnecessary classification and over-classification," 4
and directed department heads to initiate a prompt review of
requests for disclosure "in order to preserve the effectiveness and
integrity of the classification system and to eliminate accumulation of classified material which no longer requires protection in
the defense interests."'" As part of the general review procedure,
the Order directed a presidential staff member to hear and take
War II were in the National Archives and that 50 million more such documents were in
the possession of various departments and agencies. Id. at 21.
35. 3 C.F.R. (1949-53 Comp.) 789 (1958).
36. See Note, Reform in the Classification and Declassificationof NationalSecurity
Information: Nixon Executive Order 11,652, 59 IowA L. REv. 110, 114-16 (1973).
37. 3 C.F.R. (1949-53 Comp.) 979 (1958). President Kennedy's promulgation of Executive Order No. 10,964, 3 C.F.R. (1959-63 Comp.) 486 (1964), amended the original Eisenhower order by providing a schedule for automatic downgrading and declassification. The
Order was eventually revoked and superseded by Executive Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R.
375 (1973), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,714, 3A C.F.R. 174 (1974). See notes 159-77
infra and accompanying text. The mechanics of Executive Order 10,501 retain their importance, however, as the judicial review authorized by the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1971), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975), requires determination of whether
information has been properly classified under the executive order in effect at the time of
classification. Information classified before 1972 would fall under the procedures and
prescriptions of Executive Order No. 10,501.
38. The "top secret" designation was reserved for information requiring the "highest
degree of protection" in that disclosure "could result in exceptionally grave damageto the
nation." The "secret" designation was reserved for information which, if disclosed, could
"result in serious damage to the nation." The "confidential" designation was reserved for
information which "could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation." Exec.
Order No. 10,501, § 1, 3 C.F.R. (1949-53 Comp.) 979-80 (1958) (emphasis added).
39. Exec. Order No. 10,501, § 2, 3 C.F.R. (1949-53 Comp.) 979-80 (1958).
40. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 980.
41. Id. § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 980-81.
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action upon complaints from citizens,4 2 subject to review by the
National Security Council. 3 As a general statement of policy, the
Order directed that "no information [be] withheld hereunder
which the people of the United States have a right to know
"44

While Executive Order No. 10,501 was a vast improvement
over its predecessor, it had many objectionable features. Seeking
primarily to avoid underclassification, it contained "blanket classification" provisions under which an entire document, file, or
group of physically connected documents was to be given the
classification of its highest classified component, notwithstanding that paragraphs, sections, or pages therein would not otherwise carry the classification." The mechanics of declassification
were left unclear, amounting in large part to reliance upon benevolent agency action.4 6 In sharp contrast to the existence of penalties for the improper release of sensitive information,47 the Order
provided no meaningful sanction for overclassification.
Judicial review of classification pursuant to the orders was
consistent with the prevailing attitude on executive privilege. In
Scarbeck v. United States," for example, a foreign service employee was found to have violated a federal espionage law by
communicating classified information to foreign representatives.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not require
the Government to show that the information had been properly
classified. The court reasoned that it is not its province to determine whether a classifying officer has arrived at a proper conclusion. If it did so,"
[t]he Government might well be compelled . . . to reveal policies and information going far beyond the scope of the classified
documents transferred by the employee. The embarrassments
and hazards of such a proceeding could soon render [the espionage law involved] an entirely useless statute.
In sum, until the amendment of the Freedom of Information
42. Id. § 16, 3 C.F.R. at 985.
43. Id. § 17.

44. Id. § 18, 3 C.F.R. at 986.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. §§ 3(B)-(C), 3 C.F.R. at 980.
See id. § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 980-81.
See id. § 5(I), 3 C.F.R. at 982.
317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
Id. at 560.
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Act in 1974, the public could not force review of security classification determinations. The only way in which it might be informed of controversial government policies in the national security area was through a "system of off the record press briefings
and selective leaking of information."' "
II.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION,

1966-1974

During the mid-1950's, Congress began to investigate the
possibility of enacting some type of public disclosure statute. In
1955, the House created the Special Subcommittee on Government Information.'" Its purpose was to "ascertain the trend in the
availability of Government information," to "scrutinize the information practices of executive agencies and officials," and to
"seek practicable solutions for [the] shortcomings" it found.52
The first result of extensive investigative hearings by the Subcommittee and its successor standing subcommittees"3 was a 1958
amendment to the Housekeeping Statute54 which prohibited department heads from using the statute as a basis for withholding
information from the public. Then, in 1962, President Kennedy
informed the Congress that he had advised the federal bureaucracy that the power to assert a claim of executive privilege to
withhold sensitive national security information would henceforth be limited to the President himself and would not be avail50. Comment, The First Amendment and the Public Right to Information, 35 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 93, 106 (1973).
51. See Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Government Information of the
House Comm. on Government Operations,Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
52. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) [accompanying H.R. 12471,
amendment to the Freedom of Information Act], U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6268-69
(1974).
53. See id. at 4, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6269. The Senate was also studying
the problem of government secrecy with the aim of enacting remedial legislation. See
Hearingson S. 921 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958); Hearings on S. 1666 & S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,Freedom of Information,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Hearingson S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964); Hearingson S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758 & S. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on AdministrativePracticeand Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1160].
54. Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-619, 72 Stat. 547, amending R.S. § 161 (1875)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1971) corresponds to 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958)); see note 6 supra.
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able to delegatees of executive power. 5
By the mid-1960's, however, it was apparent that further
congressional action would be required to open government to the
people. 6 National security information classified pursuant to executive order 7 was of course not affected by the presidential pronouncement limiting the use of executive privilege. In general,
the prevailing judicial interpretation of the "public information"
section of the Administrative Procedure Act 5 s remained "the
major statutory excuse for withholding Government records from
public view."59 A Government Operations Committee report concluded that 0
[i]n the time it takes for one generation to grow up and prepare
to join the councils of Government ... the law which was designed to provide public information about Government activities [had] become the Government's major shield of secrecy.
The Freedom of Information Act, a product of more than
55. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966) [accompanying S. 1160,
the Freedom of Information Act], U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2419-20 (1966)
[hereinafter referred to as 1966 H.R. REP.]. President Johnson affirmed this position in
a letter to Congressman Moss, dated April 2, 1965. Id. at 3, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2420.
56. The Government seems to withhold information impulsively. For an excellent
examination of government secrecy see Henkin, supra note 12, at 275-76:
Government frequently withholds more and for longer than it has to. Officials,
of course, tend to resolve doubts in favor of non-disclosure. Some concealment
is improperly motivated-to cover up mistakes, to promote private or partisan
interests, even to deceive another branch or department of government, or the
electorate.
57. See notes 33-47 supra and accompanying text.
58. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946); see notes 7-8
supra and accompanying text.
59. 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 3, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2420.
60. Id. at 12, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2429. The Committee's report outlined
some of the statute's more egregious faults:
In a sense, "public information" is a misnomer for 5 U.S.C. 1002, since the
section permits withholding of Federal agency records if secrecy is required "in
the public interest" or if the records relate "solely to the internal management
of an agency." Government information also may be held confidential "for good
cause found." Even if no good cause can be found for secrecy, the records will
be made available only to "persons properly and directly concerned." Neither
in the Administrative Procedure Act nor its legislative history are these broad
phrases defined, nor is there a recognition of the basic right of any person-not
just those special classes "properly and directly concerned"-to gain access to
the records of official Government actions. Above all, there is no remedy avail.
able to a citizen who has been wrongfully denied access to the Government's
public records.
Id. at 5, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2422.
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eight years of congressional investigation and study, was signed
into law by President Johnson on July 4, 1966.1 The House and
Senate Committee Reports and the floor debate in the House of
Representatives plainly reveal that Congress' overriding concern
was to establish a general policy of full agency disclosure. 2 Recognition that "the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies" 3 led the lawmakers
to pass a statute which would ensure an increased flow of information to the public.
The Act establishes a new concept of public records law by
making records available to any person requesting them." A
party seeking information is no longer required to provide proof
of some special interest in it; the only requirement is a reasonable
description of the materials sought. 5 The United States district
courts are given jurisdiction to order disclosure of any agency
records improperly withheld. 6 The courts are empowered to inquire into the propriety of any agency withholding in a de novo
proceeding.7 Thus, judicial review of administrative decisions to
withhold requested information is extended beyond its traditional scope. The burden of proof is placed on the agency 8 because an agency refusing to disclose information will usually be
the only party with sufficient knowledge to effectively argue its
case.
The Act specifies nine distinct types of information which are
61. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, codified by Act of June 5,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1971)). For a comprehensive study of the Act's legislative history see Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary
Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 761 (1967).
62. See 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 2-4, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 241823, 2429; S. REP. No. 813, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO
INFORMATION, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as 1965 S.REP.]; 112
CONG. REC. 13640-61 (1966) (especially remarks of Rep. Moss, id. at 13641).
63. 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 12, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2429.
64. "[Elach agency . . . shall make the records promptly available to any person."
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1966), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
65. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1971), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
66. On complaint, the district court . . . [either in the district where the
complainant resides or has his principal place of business, or in the district
where the agency records are located] . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency
from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1966), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
67. "In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo. . . ...
Id.
68. "[The burden is on the agency to sustain its action." Id.
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exempt from its disclosure requirements.69 Disclosure is mandated "except as specifically stated."70 Therefore, the exemptions
are to be construed narrowly, 71 and disclosure is the rule rather
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1971), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. IV, (1975)):
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except
to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
The preceding exemptions were amended as follows:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but
only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to
a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a
confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation,
or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures,
or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. . ..
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1966), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975). For a criticism of the
"specifically stated" provision of the Act for the reason that it disallows judicial discretion in interpreting the vague language of some of the exemptions see Davis, supra note
61, at 783-84.
71. This conclusion flows not only from the language of the statute itself, but also
from the legislative history. See 1965 S. REP., supranote 62, at 3, 10; 1966 H.R. REP., supra
note 55, at 12, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2429. But see Davis, supra note 61, at 76263. Professor Davis notes that while a review of the House floor debate and the Senate
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than the exception."2
Executive Privilege
While the Freedom of Information Act succeeded in closing
some of the loopholes in its predecessor statute (section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act),7 3 on its face the new Act failed to
resolve the role of executive privilege within the statutory scheme
for disclosure of national security information. As one commentator has noted:74
Legislative history of the [Act] reveals scant consideration by
Congress of the status of executive privilege under the new
law. . . The only attention paid the privilege was the fear
occasionally raised in the hearings that the broad sweep of the
Act might unconstitutionally infringe upon the President's powers. Those fears were either allayed or ignored as Congress
pushed the Act to overwhelming passage.
Resolution of the role of executive privilege is vital to the institution of any statutory scheme under which the courts are empowered to order disclosure of information which the executive seeks
to withhold. Although the Act does not specifically mention the
Committee Report supports a narrow reading of the exemptions, there is language in the
House Report which indicates a contrary intent. The Report states that "[tlhe Court will
have authority whenever it considers such action equitable and appropriateto enjoin the
agency from withholding its records and to order production of agency records improperly
withheld." 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 9, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2426
(emphasis added). This language might enable a court to read the exemptions expansively. The courts, however, have viewed the Senate Report as a more accurate reflection
of the legislative intent. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 44 U.S.L.W. 4503
(U.S. Apr. 21, 1976); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792 n.6, 797 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman
v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 678-79 & n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Thus, the Act's exemptions have
been construed narrowly. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
72. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 122 (D.D.C.), stayed on other grounds,
Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum).
73. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), as amended, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 1975); see notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
74. 49 TExAs L. REV. 780, 785-86 (1971); see, e.g., Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S.
1758 & S. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedureof the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1965) (statement of Norbert
Schlei, A.A.G., Dep't of Justice) ("[T]he Executive is accountable only to the electorate.
Under the separation of powers concept, Congress cannot transfer responsibility for executive records to the courts.") The Department of Justice ultimately took the position that
the Act, as worded, was not violative of the Executive's constitutional prerogatives. See
statement of Wozencraft, A.A.G., Dep't of Justice, in Panelon the PublicInformation Act
and Interpretative& Advisory Rulings, as reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1967).
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privilege, it incorporates the executive order authorizing national
security classification into the first exemption: "This section does
not apply to matters that are: (1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense
or foreign policy . . ..., Thus, by exempting classified national
security information, Congress accounted in part for the executive's privilege.
The immediate problem of statutory interpretation, however, was to determine to what extent the doctrine of executive
privilege operates over and above its inclusion through the executive order. Conceptually, the privilege might impose a separate
and distinct limitation upon the Act's disclosure requirements.
Arguably, the codification of some of the components of executive
privilege 6 "is augmented by a rule of executive privilege attaining
constitutional dimensions"7 7 arising out of the separation of powers concept. 71 It would follow that "[tjhis uncertain
constitutional doctrine operates as an invisible, albeit inevitable,
restraint upon the scope of the FOIA."79 President Johnson assumed that the Act left the executive's privileges intact, stating
when he signed the bill into law: "[It] in no way impairs the
President's power under our Constitution to provide for confidentiality when the national interest so requires."8 On the other
hand, the proposition that the Act was intended as a complete
codification of the executive's privileges has had its adherents as
well. They contend that in establishing nine exemptions, "[t]he
draftsmen were trying to make specific in statutory terms the
many strands of executive privilege which had been viewed in the
past as bases for presidential control over information coming
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1966), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975). It has been argued
that the "specifically required" language of the first exemption means that for classified
information to qualify for exempt status under the Act, it must be either personally
classified by the President, or supported by a separate executive order. See EPA v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973). This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court when it held
that since Congress was familiar with the order and the character of the classification
procedures thereunder, it must have intended that the delegation of authority to classify
should fall within the parameters of the national security exemption. Id. at 82-84.
76. See generally Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966).
77. Note, The Freedom of InformationAct: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 895, 930 (1974).
78. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080-83 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring); Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy:An Unresolved ConstitutionalQuestion,
66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957). See also notes 13-25 supra and accompanying text.
79. Note, 74 CoLuM. L. REv., supra note 77, at 930.
80. 41 C.F.R. §§ 105-60.603 (1969) (statement of President Johnson, July 4, 1966).
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from the executive department." 8 '
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis stated at the hearings before
the Senate subcommittee considering the proposed enactment: 2
We do not have a body of judge-made law on this subject. The
only interpretations that we have in the Federal system are
interpretations by the executive branch itself.
One of the things that would happen under section 3(c) is
that some of these questions for the first time would come to
court. Presumably the courts would gradually mark some lines
as to what are the limits of the doctrine of executive privilege.
Thus, the courts might ultimately adopt the position, suggested
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds,83 that the
courts themselves must determine under what circumstances a
claim of privilege is appropriate.
JudicialInterpretation
Of the cases decided under the national security exemption
of the 1966 Act, only one presented the executive privilege issue.
4 the appellants brought suit under the FreeIn Soucie v. David,"
dom of Information Act to compel the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology to release the Garwin Report, an evaluation of the federal program for development of the supersonic
transport. Chief Judge Bazelon distinguished between the right
of the government to withhold information under the doctrine of
executive privilege, which "to some degree [is] inherent in the
constitutional requirement of separation of powers, 8 5 and the
executive's right to withhold information under the statutory
exemptions provided by the Freedom of Information Act. Deciding the case on other grounds,86 the court left unresolved the
"[s]erious constitutional questions . . .presented by a claim of
executive privilege as a defense to a suit under the Freedom of
Information Act,"" for example, "whether the disclosure provi51. Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information
Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 745 (1975); see 1966 H.R. REP., supra note 55, at 2423.
82. Hearings on S. 1160, supra note 53, at 146.
83. 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); see notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
84. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. Id. at 1071 n.9.
86. Id. at 1073. The district court had dismissed on the ground that the Office of
Science and Technology was not an "agency" within the meaning of the Freedom of
Information Act, and therefore was not subject to the Act's requirements. Id.
87. Id. at 1071.
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sions of the Act exceed the constitutional power of Congress to
88
control the actions of the executive branch."
Litigation centered on the role of the courts in applying the
exemption to requests for disclosure. The "imprecise language of
the exemption" required that the courts refer to the legislative
history.89 One interpretation would have permitted judicial determination of whether the classified information had been properly
classified according to the standards of the appropriate executive
order." The other view, adopted by the Department of Justice in
a memorandum issued to all executive agencies,"' was that so long
as a document had been classified pursuant to executive order,
disclosure under the Act was impermissible. 2 The court would
thus be limited to a determination of whether a particular document had in fact been classified.
The courts ultimately adopted the latter interpretation. In
Epstein v. Resor,3 one of the first cases to consider the
permissible scope of judicial review and a decision consistent with
earlier decisions under the executive privilege doctrine,94 the
Ninth Circuit held that national security classification is an executive function beyond the scope of judicial review. The court
limited judicial inquiry to whether, on the basis of affidavits submitted by the Government, the classification appeared "arbitrary
88. Id. at 1072.
89. Note, 74 CoLum. L. REv., supra note 77, at 930; see, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73 (1973).
90. See, e.g., Note, Access to Government Information and the ClassificationProcess-Is there a Right to Know?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814, 821-23, 839-40 (1971).
91. Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative ProcedureAct, as revised effective July 4, 1967, United States Dep't of
Justice, Ramsey Clark, Attorney General, as reprintedin 20 AD. L. REv. 263 (1967) (containing an interpretation of the exemptions in which all doubts were resolved in favor of
restricting access to information, id. at 297-308).
92. Id. at 298.
93. 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970), af'g 296 F. Supp.
214 (N.D. Cal. 1969). Suit was brought by an historian who sought access to an Army file
designated "Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens-Operation Keelhaul."
The file was compiled during World War HI and had retained its top secret classification
since 1948. The Government had argued that the Act's provision for de novo review did
not apply to any of the nine listed exemptions since the statute precluded application of
"this section" to them. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1971). The Court rejected this argument and,
while noting that the Act was awkwardly drawn, stated that:
[I]n view of the legislative purpose to make it easier for private citizens to
secure Government information, it seems most unlikely that it was intended to
foreclose an (a)(3) judicial review of the circumstances of exemption.
Epstein v. Resor, supra at 932-33.
94. See notes 13-25 supra and accompanying text.
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or capricious." 5 Noting that the national security exemption was
"couched in terms significantly different from the other exemptions,"9 the court reasoned that "what is desirable in the interest of national defense and foreign policy is not the sort of
question that courts are designed to deal with."97 Thus, despite
the provision for de novo review of questions arising under the
Act, the court would not allow itself to review the propriety of
particular national security classifications.
The level of review permitted in Epstein v. Resor was derived
from the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Reynolds." The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court which,
quoting Professor Davis' analysis of the Act, had concluded that
the Act's provision for de novo review could be reconciled with the
very limited review authorized by Reynolds:9
"'Under the separation of powers concept, Congress cannot
transfer responsibility for Executive records to the courts.' That
position seems to me extreme, just as is the opposite position
that the courts may take the whole power away from the executive would be extreme; the long-term constitutional solution is
likely to follow the middle position of the Reynolds case that the
executive determines the scope of the privilege, subject to a
judicial check whenever a court has jurisdiction."
Thus, the de novo review provision in the Freedom of Information
Act is a grant of jurisdiction, ' but the judicial check on the
95. Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970) (the court found that the
withholding at issue was not "arbitrary and capricious").
96. Id. at 933. The provision exempts information which is "specifically required by
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy."
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1966), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975) (emphasis added).
97. Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970). The court reached this conclusion although an affidavit submitted to the trial court by Congressman Moss, a co-author
of the Act, explained that the statute intended to give "broadest latitude to review all
agency acts in this regard ... and that the powers granted to the Court and the burdens
placed upon the Government . . . were meant to include rather than exclude the
[national security] exemption." Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
98. 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
99. Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214, 218 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970), quoting Davis, The InformationAct: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 764-65 (1967), quoting Hearings on S. 1160, supra
note 53, at 192, 205 (statement of Norbert Schlei, A.A.G.).
100. Jurisdiction might also be predicated on the Administrative Procedure Act's
codification of the court's traditional obligation to prevent arbitrary administrative action. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1971).
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executive's privilege was merely review to prevent its "arbitrary
and capricious" exercise.
It was not clear from Epstein v. Resor how the standard
suggested in that case might be applied in other cases. It has been
advanced by one commentator that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard does not leave the courts with much to review at
all.0 ' In United States v. Bianchi & Co.,"02 the Supreme Court
noted that the standard has "frequently been used by Congress
and [has] consistently been associated with a review limited to
the administrative record." ' 3 The inquiry is one into the reasonableness of the agency action based on the evidence which was
before it. In the context of national security classification there
is no administrative record to review. Thus, a finding of
"arbitrary" or "capricious" conduct could only mean that the
information is not actually contained in a classified document.'"4
The court in Epstein v. Resor reasoned that "the origin of the
file's contents itself [was] sufficient to dispel any suggestion that
the original classification was arbitrary or capricious."'' 5 Thus,
despite the policies behind the enactment, the Ninth Circuit left
the decision of what the public should know about national security matters where it was before the Act, exclusively in the hands
of the administrative agencies.
The interpretation by the Ninth Circuit in Epstein v. Resor
was a guidepost for other circuits struggling with the same question. In Soucie v. David,'' the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia ruled that review of a national security classification
is limited to a determination of whether it was arbitrarily and
capriciously made. In United States v. Marchetti,'7 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted a similar interpretation
101. See Note, 74 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 77, at 935 n.215.
102. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
103. Id. at 715. See also Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
104. Arguably, the imposition of such a standard could take the form of a heavy
burden on the Government to prove that documents had been duly classified. See, e.g.,
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975) (holding that such a burden is inappropriate).
105. 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970).
106. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). On the basis of Epstein and Soucie lower courts
held that when the classifying agency makes a reasonable showing that disclosure would
be harmful to the national defense or foreign policy, it need not submit the requested
material to the court for in camera review. See, e.g., Moss v. Laird, C.A. 1254-71 (D.D.C.
Dec. 7, 1971) (unreported opinion) (a suit brought by Representative Moss and others to
gain access to classified portions of the Pentagon Papers).
107. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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in a case with an unusual fact pattern. The court affirmed an
injunction to enforce a secrecy agreement between the CIA and
one of its employees.' The agreement, of a type routinely required of CIA personnel, provided that the employee submit for
approval, before its release or publication, anything concerning
the agency or its intelligence methods and procedures obtained
by virtue of employment with the agency and not otherwise obtainable. The court held that the agreement was enforceable
through an injunctive proceeding, but only insofar as it related
to classified information. Nonclassified information could not be
suppressed. Marchetti was entitled to judicial review of any action by the CIA disapproving publication, but such review would
be limited to the issue of "whether or not the information was
classified and, if so, whether or not, by prior disclosure, it had
come into the public domain."'' 9 The court would not examine
the merits of the classification itself. The principles underlying
this restrictive ruling were virtually the same as had been found
controlling in Epstein v. Resor and the earlier cases on executive
privilege: the process of classification, as part of the executive
function in the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense, is
beyond the scope of judicial review.1' 0 Moreover, practical consid108. For the text of the agreement see id. at 1312. Marchetti challenged the constitutionality of the agreement on first amendment grounds, arguing that because the Government had failed to meet the very heavy burden against any prior restraint on expression,
an injunction enforcing the agreement was barred by the Supreme Court's decision in the
Pentagon Papers case. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
The court held that the agreement concerned classified information "touching upon the
national defense and the conduct of foreign affairs, acquired by Marchetti while in a
position of trust and confidence and contractually bound to [secrecy]." Marchetti v.
United States, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir. 1972). Therefore, no first amendment interests
were violated. Id. at 1317. The court reasoned that the first amendment was not intended
to protect every utterance, that the government has a constitutional privilege to maintain
a level of secrecy consistent with the nation's security needs, and that secrecy agreements
with employees provide a reasonable means by which to protect the internal secrets of
government agencies. Such agreements, however, would only be enforceable to the extent
that they prevented the disclosure of classified information. Id. at 1318. For a valuable
analysis of the first amendment issues raised see 51 N.C.L. REv. 865 (1973).
109. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972). While the case
did not involve construction of the national security exemption under the Act, it has since
been held in Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975), that the scope of review permissible when a citizen already in possession of classified information seeks to release it is virtually the same as that in cases where
access itself is sought under the Act. In both instances the issue is the extent to which
the courts can review an administrative decision to classify information. The Marchettitype case requires resolution of the additional question of whether a prior restraint on
publication of such information is permissible under the first amendment.
110. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
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erations militate against judicial involvement in classification
disputes:"'
What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put
the questioned item of information in its proper context. The
courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped
in foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review
of secrecy classifications in that area.
While the Marchetti decision did not mention the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard established in Epstein v. Resor, Judge
Craven's concurring opinion suggested another approach to classification issues. Although agreeing with the majority that what
may be done by the President under his power over the conduct
of foreign relations is not subject to judicial inquiry, he stated
that an adjudication of the reasonableness of a secrecy classification may be warranted by the growing recognition of a "right to
13
know." ' 2 Judge Craven would, therefore, have held that:
[T]he classification of documents and information by the executive [is] subject to judicial review. Because the national security may be involved and because of the expertise of the executive, I would resolve any doubt about the reasonableness of a
classification in favor of the government. If the burden were put
upon one who assails the classification, and surely it ought to
be, much of the difficulty envisioned in the court's opinion
would presumably disappear.
Judge Craven's suggested presumption of reasonableness might
work well in a Marchetti-type situation, where the litigant already possesses the information and the litigated issue is whether
he can release it to the public. A petitioner seeking to compel
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, on the other
hand, is not in a position to argue the unreasonableness of a
particular classification since the very purpose of his lawsuit is to
gain access to information he does not have.11 4 The best he could
111. Id. at 1318.
112. Id. at 1318-19 (Craven, J., concurring):
"The right to know" is in a period of gestation. I think that the people will
increasingly insist upon knowing what their government is doing and that, because this knowledge is vital to government by the people, the "right to know"
will grow.
113. Id. at 1318.
114. It is for this very reason that Congress placed the burden on the administrative
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hope for is in camera inspection of the material sought to be
withheld in order to obtain an independent determination of the
reasonableness of the classification. It was this procedure, however, which the Supreme Court disallowed in EPA v. Mink."'
Mink was the Supreme Court's initial attempt to delimit the
boundaries of the national security exemption under the Freedom
of Information Act. Thirty-three members of Congress sued to
enjoin the withholding of nine documents which were classified
secret and top secret by the EPA pursuant to Executive Order
No. 10,501. The documents were relevant to an ongoing debate
on a planned underground nuclear test on Amchitka Island,
Alaska. The affidavit of John N. Irwin II, then Under Secretary
of State, was submitted to the district court. It attested to the
fact that the documents involved highly sensitive matters vital
to the national defense and foreign policy, and had been classified secret and top secret pursuant to executive order. On the
strength of this affidavit alone, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Agency." 6 The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed and concluded that the
national security exemption permits withholding of only the
secret portions of those documents bearing a separate classification under the executive order and requires disclosure of the
nonsecret components if separable." 7 The case was remanded
with instructions to examine the classified documents in camera,
"looking toward their possible separation for purposes of disclo"8 The Supreme Court reversed,
sure or nondisclosure . ..*.
holding that the national security exemption: (1) bars disclosure
of any classified document and (2) bars in camera inspection to
sift out nonsecret components."' The Agency had therefore met
agencies to sustain their determinations in suits brought pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
115. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
116. See Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
The district court also upheld the Government's claim that the information fell within
the Act's fifth exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1971), covering interagency memoranda.
117. Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
118. Id. at 746.
119. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973), rev'g 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The
dissenters argued forcefully, with reference to legislative history for support, that the de
novo review provision of the Act applied with equal force to all of the exemptions. EPA
v. Mink, supra at 96 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 106-07 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The
Act's supporters had indicated in floor debate that they envisioned in camera review of
contested national security information. See, e.g., 112 CONG. REc. 13659 (1966) (remarks
of Rep. Gallagher):
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its burden of demonstrating that the documents were entitled to
protection under the exemption.2 0
The decision in Mink was based on a reading of the congressional intent, rather than a reading of executive privilege into the
Act's proscriptions.12' Finding that Congress intended the Act to

"in no way [affect] categories of information which the President

. .

has determined must be classified to protect the na-

tional defense or to advance foreign policy,"' 22 the Court concluded that: "Congress chose to follow the Executive's determi'
nation in these matters and that choice must be honored."'
Thus, since Executive Order No. 10,501 permitted classification
of all documents according to their highest classifiable component, the Court had no choice but to uphold the procedure. 4
The Court's opinion was implicitly an approval of the prior
case law on the scope of judicial review under the Act. Its reliance, however, was on statutory intent rather than executive
privilege. As Justice Stewart stated in his concurring opinion: 12
[T]he language of the exemption, confirmed by its legislative
history, plainly withholds from disclosure matters "specifically
required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy." In short, once a federal court
has determined that the Executive has imposed that requirement, it may go no further under the Act.
.. . [Congress] has built into the Freedom of Information
It can be anticipated that the judicial review provision, if nothing else, will have
a major salutary effect, in that Government employees, down the line, are going
to be very cautious about placing a secrecy stamp on a document that a district
court later might order to be produced.
120. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973).
121. As Justice Stewart indicated in his concurring opinion:
This case presents no constitutional claims, and no issues regarding the nature
or scope of "Executive privilege" . . . . The case before us involves only the
meaning of two exemptive provisions of the so-called Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
Id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 83 (1973), quoting 112 CONG. REc. 13659 (1966) (remarks of Representative
Gallagher).
123. Id. at 81.
124. Contra, id. at 102 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("it
would seem odd, to say the least, to attribute to Congress an intent to incorporate 'without
reference' Executive Order 10,501 into Exemption 1"). Justice Brennan would read the
Act as incorporating the Order's standards for classification, rather than each and every
procedure specified.
125. Id. at 94-95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Act an exemption that provides no means to question an Executive decision to stamp a document "secret," however cynical,
myopic, or even corrupt that decision might have been.
The majority in Mink deferred to the congressional judgment.
Acknowledging that Congress has the power to legislate standards
and procedures by which the courts are to determine what information the executive can withhold, the Court took no position
concerning to what degree, if any, the doctrine of executive privi2
lege acts as a limitation upon this congressional power:1 1
Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive
Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its
own procedures-subject only to whatever limitationsthe Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional
ordering.
Thus, the task of providing on adequate review mechanism for
national security classification was left to the legislators.
The decision also expressed no view on whether the limited
judicial scrutiny of agency classifications authorized in Epstein
v. Resor comported with the doctrine of executive privilege. The
Court never reached this issue since neither the fact of classification nor the classification's reasonableness was before it. The
sole issue on appeal of the b(1) question was whether in camera
inspection in order to excise nonclassified information is permissible.1 2 The appropriateness of an "arbitrary and capricious"
review standard would be questionable, however, in light of the
general tenor of the Mink decision.
The net result was that in the years since the Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds there was no definitive ruling clarifying or resolving the issues which arise when the time-honored
doctrine of executive privilege clashes with the recently recognized right of the public to know. When considered in conjunction with Mink's very restrictive interpretation of the judicial
role under the national security exemption to the Freedom of
Information Act, this fact lent support to Justice Douglas' view
126. Id. at 83 (emphasis added), citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
With the passage of the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Congress
has enacted just such legislation. Section 552(b) provides that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion
of the portions which are exempt under this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. IV,
1975).
127. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973).
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that despite the broad policies of open government and liberal
disclosure adopted by Congress, "[t]he Executive Branch now
ha[d] carte blanche to insulate information from public scrutiny
whether or not that information [bore] any discernible relation
to the interests sought to be protected by subsection b(1) of the
12
Act."7 8
Lower court decisions subsequent to Mink followed the decision faithfully. Most notable among these was the decision in
Wolfe v. Froehlke,12 1 in which the release of the "Operation Keelhaul" file litigated in Epstein v. Resor was once again the subject
of a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act."'0 There was
no mention of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard which the
same court had approved only four years earlier in Epstein v.
Resor. Citing Mink as "the definitive case to date on the first
exemption to the . . . Act,""13 the district court denied the request, stating that "absent allegations of fraud or subterfuge the
Court is not to look beyond the fact of procedurally proper classi'1 32
fication of documents pursuant to Executive Order
II.

THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

ACT

Executive Privilege versus The Right to Know
After the decision in EPA v. Mink, 3 it was clear that concealment of foreign affairs and defense-related information would
remain largely unaffected by the Freedom of Information Act.
The extent of judicial review of any matter classified in the interest of national security was the same as that under the earlier
128. Id. at 110 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
129. 358 F. Supp. 1318 (D.D.C. 1973), affd mem., 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
accord, Shaffer v. Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (an action under the Freedom
of Information Act to order the Secretary of State to disclose reports concerning conditions
in prisoner-of-war camps in South Vietnam).
130. See notes 93-105 supra and accompanying text. Since the Epstein decision, the
government had determined that it no longer objected to declassification of the file in
issue. Since the British government maintained its objection, however, the information
was kept classified on the theory that its release would be detrimental to United States'
foreign relations. It was this basis for the withholding which the plaintiffs unsuccessfully
challenged.
131. Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973), afl'd mem., 510 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
132. Id. The court of appeals refused the appellant's request to defer decision until
the expected passage of the proposed amendment to the Freedom of Information Act. The
amendment provides for judicial determination of the propriety of executive classification.
See notes 192-94 infra and accompanying text.
133. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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"executive privilege" analysis.' 34 Criticism of the Mink decision
was widespread.' 35 The entire line of cases interpreting the Act's
national security exemption ran directly counter to the policy of
review which was explicitly recognized by Congress when it created a judicial remedy for any unauthorized withholding.'35
The very restrictive application given to the Act's de novo
review provision in national security cases seemed to contradict
not only the Act's basic policy objectives, but its express language
as well. The cases held in essence that "the only 'matter' to be
determined de novo under section 552(b) (1) is whether in fact the
President has required by Executive Order that the documents in
question are to be kept secret.' 3 Traditional formulations of de
novo review would indicate that Congress intended something
more.'3 8 The construction limiting review under the exemption to
a narrow, nonsubstantive, factual determination under which a
"bare claim of confidentiality" would "immunize agency files
from scrutiny,' ' 3 was an unlikely one since the drafters envisioned it to be a judicial, not an agency function to determine the
validity of claims to exemption. 4 ' Congress, in fact, explicitly
stated that the courts were to review the "propriety" of agency
withholding.' 4 ' One commentator observed: "the Court's suggested alternatives to in camera review . . . will be ineffective
. . . as they invest in the agencies a faculty for circumventing the
FOIA."4 2
134. See notes 13-25 supra and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption'sAlley, 60 A.B.A.J. 550,
551-52 (1974); Comment, 35 U. PITT. L. REV., supra note 50, at 108-13; 42 U. GIN. L. REV.
529 (1973).
136. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
137. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 95 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.07, at 152 (1958):
[T]he court often reviews de novo both in the sense that it takes its own
evidence and in the sense that it uses its own independent judgment on law,
facts, policy, and discretion.
139. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970).
140. Id.
141. S. REP. No. 813,89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965). The Act was explained as follows:
That the proceeding must be de novo is essential in order that the ultimate
decision as to the propriety of the agency's action is made by the court [thus]
prevent[ing] it from becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.
Placing the burden of proof upon the agency puts the task of justifying the
withholding on the only party able to explain it.

Id.
142. Note, 74 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 77, at 911.
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Some of the principal pragmatic arguments made to support
the very restrictive application of the de novo review provision
were that courts cannot be trusted with extremely sensitive material and that judges are not qualified to make what are essentially
determinations of an executive character.' There is little basis
for the argument that courts are less trustworthy in their handling of national security material than the executive departments whose employees have daily access to it, or the legislative
committees which occasionally examine such material in closed
session. Wigmore once queried whether "it [is] to be said that
even this much of disclosure [in camera] cannot be trusted?
Shall every subordinate in the department have access to the
secret, and not the presiding officer of justice?"'44
That the judicial branch is not qualified to pass judgment
upon agency classifications because it lacks the expertise peculiar
to the executive branch in national security matters is a more
formidable objection.4 5 Courts, however, are constantly requested to make judgments in areas in which they have no substantive expertise. It is the function of the adversary system to
educate the court in such cases. This occurs in review under all
but one of the other eight exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act"' and in many other cases in which courts are asked to
review actions of an administrative agency, for example, in review
of the adequacy of the impact statements required under the
National Environmental Policy Act. 4 ' Review of classifications
under the standards of the executive orders requires no greater
143. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368-69 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317-18 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
144. 8 J. WOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2379 (3d ed. 1940); see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc, plurality opinion). The Zweibon court held that a warrant
must be obtained before a wiretap may be installed on a domestic organization even
though a presidential directive authorized such wiretaps in the interest of national security. Addressing the issue of the security risks posed by in camera inspection, the court
stated that "given the number of individuals already involved [in the decisionmaking
process] [citation omitted], the additional oversight of a single federal judge poses a
miniscule marginal risk of a security breach." Id. at 647 n.157.
145. See, e.g., text accompanying note 111 supra. Contra, Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d 594, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("judges do, in fact, have the capabilities needed to
consider and weigh data pertaining to the foreign affairs and national defense of this
nation").
146. The third exemption which excepts material "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute" will not usually call for an independent judgment by the court. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3) (1971), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1975).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1971).
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expertise than does review of environmental impact statements.
While it has been held that the judiciary is constitutionally
barred from conducting any substantive review of agency classification, "' there is constitutional support for the contrary view. In
juxtaposition to the separation of powers principle supporting the
executive's national security privilege, 49 the system of checks and
balances permits each branch of government to operate as a restraint upon the others. The role of constitutional arbiter has

devolved upon the courts, the Supreme Court becoming "the entity possessing sole and final authority to determine the limits of
)7150
executive privilege ....

It is well established that executive power, "like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the

applicable provisions of the Constitution."' 5 It is the judicial
branch of government which is able to insure that actions taken

under cover of executive privilege are in conformity with constituthe alternative
tional prescriptions.5 2 In the area of information,
3
5
of no judicial review, according to Wigmore,

148. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972). See notes 107-11 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
150. Strong, President, Congress, Judiciary:One is More Equal than the Others, 60
A.B.A.J. 1050 (1974) (demonstrating that a doctrine of "constitutional review" permits a
judicial check on the legitimate exercise of the executive's privilege). See also R. BERGER,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974).
151. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); accord,
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 604-05, 619-27
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc, plurality opinion). In Zweibon the court noted that
although the attempt to claim Executive prerogatives or infringe liberty in the
name of security and order may be motivated by the highest of ideals [footnote
omitted], the judiciary must remain vigilantly prepared to fulfill its own responsibility to channel Executive action within constitutional bounds.
Id. at 604-05. The court labeled it a "misconception" that "Executive power in the domain
of foreign relations . . . [is] exempt from judicial review or immune to constitutional
limitations." Id. at 626.
152. One such prescription may be the public's right to know which is implicit in the
first amendment. A proponent of such a right is Thomas Emerson who concludes that
freedom of expression "includes the right to hear the views of others and to listen to their
version of the facts. It encompasses the right to inquire and, to a degree, the right of access
to information." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3 (Random House
ed. 1970). Advocates of the public's "right to know" acknowledge that the right is not
specifically stated in the Constitition, but indicate that it may be inferred from it. See
Note, 17 N.Y.L.F., supra note 90. "Recognition of the right to know would. . . broaden
the scope of judicial review where executive privilege is invoked by government officials
to justify non-disclosure." Id. at 836. Such judicial review might include the determination of whether, in the exercise of administrative discretion, the classifying officer had
effected an impermissible restraint on first amendment rights.
153. J. WIGMORE, supra note 144, § 2379, at 810. Such was the case during the
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furnish[es] to bureaucratic officials too ample opportunities for
abusing the privilege. The lawful limits of the privilege are extensible beyond any control if its applicability is left to the
determination of the very official whose interest it may be to
shield a wrongdoing ....

It follows that any meaningful check upon the power of administrative agencies to classify information must reside outside the
executive branch itself.' 54
With the exception of Judge Craven's concurring opinion in
United States v. Marchetti,5 and Justice Douglas' expository
analyses in Gravel v. United States'55 and New York Times Co.
v. United States,'57 there have been no judicial expressions of a
constitutional basis for substantive review of agency classificaVietnam War when even the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was so unsuccessful in
obtaining accurate information from the executive branch that it was forced to hire its
own investigators and send them to Southeast Asia. Executive Privilege:The Withholding
of Information by the Executive, Hearingson S. 1125 Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1971). There
have been numerous instances of classification abuse. See Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 642 n.9 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); TIME, July 5, 1971, at 14. Justice
Douglas noted in his dissent in Gravel:
We are told that the military has withheld as confidential a large selection of
photographs showing atrocities against Vietnamese civilians wrought by both
Communist and United States forces ....
[O]rdinary newspaper clippings of
criticism aimed at the military have been routinely marked secret ....
Former
Justice and former Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg has
stated: "I have read and prepared countless thousands of classified documents.
In my experience, 75 percent of these documents should never have been classified in the first place; another 15 percent quickly outlived the need for secrecy;
and only about 10 percent genuinely required restricted access over any significant period of time."
Gravel v. United States, supra.
154. There is ample precedent for the type of judicial review envisioned here. In
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the Supreme Court reviewed an action by the Secretary of State taken pursuant to a direct order from the
President. Despite the Government's claim that the seizure of steel mills was necessitated
by national security and defense considerations, the Court barred it as violative of the
Constitution. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court sanctioned judicial review
of legislative apportionment, an area which is at least as much a function of the legislative
branch of government as the protection of information vital to the national security is a
function of the Executive. Thus, the fact that a particular function is traditionally left to
one branch of government, and that the separation of powers doctrine indicates that it
should remain with that branch, need not preclude judicial review to see that the action
was carried out within the limits prescribed by the Constitution.
155. 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (Craven, J., concurring).
156. 408 U.S. 606, 633 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Justice Douglas argued that
the first amendment should be preferred over all competing claims of executive privilege).
157. 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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tion determinations. As a result of Mink's interepretation of the
1966 Act judicial debate on this issue was foreclosed. A call was
then sounded for amendment of the Act whose purpose had been
to open government to the people. 158
Executive Order No. 11,652
The executive branch had itself taken steps to modify the
elements of Executive Order No. 10,501 at issue in Mink in favor
of increased disclosure. In January 1971, in an attempt to forestall
any major revision of the Freedom of Information Act which
would threaten executive control over the flow of national security information, President Nixon established an interagency
group to review Executive Order No. 10,501.111 Its work product
was Executive Order No. 11,652,60 signed by President Nixon on
March 8, 1972, overriding and superseding Executive Order No.
10,501. The new order reduced the number of agencies, departments, and agency personnel given general classification authority.'8 ' While retaining the same classification categories, the
Order narrowed the scope of the material encompassed by each.'62
A complex system of review, downgrading, and automatic declassification was established.'63 These procedures, however, were to
have only prospective effect.
With respect to classification procedure, the "blanket classification" technique challenged in Mink was eliminated. Each
page of a file is to be separately classified, and single documents
are "to the extent practicable, [to] be so marked as to indicate
which portions are classified, at what level, and which portions
are not classified in order to facilitate excerpting and other
use."'' 4 Under the new executive order, each classified document
must be identified by its office of origin, date of classification,
158. See, e.g., C. BARKER & M. Fox, CLASSIFIED FILES: THE YELLOWING PAGES (1972);
Henkin, supra note 12.
159. See 7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1019 (1971); Comment, Declassification of
Sensitive Information: A Comment on Executive Order 11652, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1052, 1060 n.63 (1973). The group was initially headed by Assistant Attorney General,
later Mr. Justice William Rehnquist, and subsequently by David Young, then a National

Security Council staff member.
160. 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,714, 3A C.F.R. 174 (1974).
161. Id. § 2, 3 C.F.R. at 376-78.
162. See id. §§ 1 (A)-(C), 3 C.F.R. at 376.
163. Id. § 5, 3 C.F.R. at 380-81.
164. Id. § 4(A), 3 C.F.R. at 379. The 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information
Act similarly provided that "any reasonably segregable portion of a record" must be
released. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. IV, 1975).
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and the name of the highest authority approving the classifica65
tion.
The Order specifically prohibits the use of the classification
stamp to conceal inefficiency or error, or to prevent personal or
departmental embarrassment, and provides that "[r]epeated
abuse of the classification process shall be grounds for an admin' The Order,
istrative reprimand."166
however, does not provide a
satisfactory method by which abuse might be exposed. The Supreme Court's decison in Mink further diminished the impact of
the provision.
A partial answer to the problem of checking the substantive
accuracy of a classification is suggested by the Order's provision
for an Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC)1 I to
hear citizen complaints about agency classification determinations. The ICRC, which is composed of representatives of the
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the CIA, and the National Security Council Staff,
and whose chairperson is appointed by the President, has the
power to order the production of documents from the classifying
agencies pursuant to its role in monitoring the implementation of
68
the executive order.
Theoretically, creation of the ICRC should have facilitated
the discovery of classification abuses and thereby made the sanction of "administrative reprimand" meaningful. In practice, the
Order gave ultimate responsibility for monitoring and implementation to the National Security Council 69 and the ICRC adopted
165. Exec. Order No. 11,652, supra note 160, at § 4.
166. Id. § 13, 3 C.F.R. at 386. The 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information
Act have since provided even stronger sanctions for classifications abuse. Section
552(a)(4)(F) directs that where a court finds that
the circumstances surrounding the withholding raise questions whether agency
personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to the withholding, the
Civil Service Commission shall promptly initiate a proceeding to determine
whether disciplinary action is warranted ....
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. IV, 1975). For a comprehensive discussion of this provision
see Vaughn, The Sanctions Provisionof the Freedom of Information Act, 25 Am.U.L. REv.
7 (1975).
167. Exec. Order No. 11,652, supra note 160, at § 7(A), 3 C.F.R. at 383-84.
168. Section 7(A) gives the ICRC power to "oversee Department actions to ensure
compliance . . . ." Id. at 383-84. Section 7(B) requires ICRC approval of departmental
regulations adopted pursuant to the Order. Id. at 384. Section 13 provides that where the
ICRC has discovered unnecessary classification or overclassification, "it shall make a
report to the head of the Department concerned in order that corrective steps may be
taken." Id. at 386.
169. Id. § 7(A), 3 C.F.R. at 383-84.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 7

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 19761

an advisory posture.' 0 The more fundamental problem, however,
is that the review procedure established by the executive order
allows representatives of the agencies which classified the material in the first instance to sit in judgment over the accuracy and
propriety of the determinations. The reviewers are likely to have
the same biases as the original classifier and to be susceptible to
similar pressures. Without at least the possibility of later judicial
review, competing considerations are unlikely to be given their
due weight, and only the most egregious cases of administrative
abuse are apt to come to light and be effectively remedied.
While Executive Order No. 11,652 contained serious defects
in its procedures for control of classification abuse, it was a step
toward that end and a vast improvement over Executive Order
No. 10,501. The new order was ostensibly "based upon . . . a
reexamination of the rationale underlying the Freedom of Information Act,'' and purported to establish a "new, more progressive system for classification and declassification of Government
documents relating to national security.' 7 2 President Nixon acknowledged that "controls which have been imposed on classification authority have proved unworkable, and classification has
frequently served to conceal bureaucratic mistakes or to prevent
embarrassment to officials and administrations."' 73 The Order
itself provided:171
Each person possessing classifying authority shall be held accountable for the propriety of the classifications attributed to
him. Both unnecessary classification and over-classification
shall be avoided. Classification shall be solely on the basis of
national security considerations.
A National Security Council directive further underscored this
policy by providing that "any substantial doubt" should be re1 75
solved in favor of "the less restrictive treatment.'
The Order was nevertheless open to substantial criticisms.
170. See Comment, 41 GEo. WASH. L. Rav., supra note 159, at 1068. The Order itself
was vague as to the relative roles of the ICRC and NSC. When it considered declassification appropriate, the ICRC would forward its recommendations to Presidential Advisor
Henry Kissinger, who would make a final decision after consultation with the National
Security Council.
171. 8 Presidential Documents 542, 543 (March 13, 1972).
172. Id. at 542.
173. Id. at 543.
174. § 4, 3 C.F.R. 375, 379 (1973).
175. NSC Directive, May 19, 1972, 37 FED. REG. 10053-54 (1972).
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These were, in brief: (1) lack of an adequate mechanism for the
control of classification abuse,"' (2) retention of presidential discretion to authorize classification by additional officials, departments, or agencies, (3) failure to require agencies and departments to routinely review classified material to determine
whether downgrading or declassification is warranted, (4) creation of unreasonably long automatic declassification periods, and
(5) exclusion of information classified prior to the effective date
of the new executive order from its automatic declassification
provisions. By far the most serious limitation on the prevention
of classification abuse, however, was the unavailability of meaningful judicial review, precluded by the Court's decision in Mink.
The decision was mystifying in light of the position taken by the
executive branch itself. Consider, for example, the statement of
David Young, former Executive Director of the ICRC:'"1
There is a two-tier mechanism. The [classifying] department
will establish a Review Committee, and then you will move up
to the Inter-Agency Committee, and then if you are unhappy,
you can go to court. That is where the Freedom of Information
Act comes in. What we have done is give the court a means for
interpreting [the national security] exemption of the Freedom
of Information Act.
The judiciary had lagged behind both the executive and legislative branches and allowed unchecked assertions of national security interests to override constitutional protections and the legislative will.
The 1974 Amendments
After the decision in New York Times Co. v. United States,"'
Congress began a series of hearings on the problem of government
secrecy. The House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and
Government Information conducted a comprehensive study of
agency action under the Freedom of Information Act, and followed this study with investigatory hearings." 9 The tone of the
176. See notes 166-70 supra and accompanying text.

177. White House Press Release of John D. Ehrlichman and David Young, March 8,
1972, at 9, reprinted in Note, 59 IOWA L. Rv., supra note 36, at 126 n.166.
178. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

179. Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices- Administration and Operationof the Freedom of Information Act Before the Foreign Operations
and Government InformationSubcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 4, 5, & 6 (1972). See also id. pt. 7 (Security Classification
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hearings generally was represented in Chairman Moorhead's
statement opening hearings on the b(1) exemption:' 0
The Congress passed a law in 1966 designed to limit Government secrecy. We listed nine categories of public records which
Government agencies might withhold. . . .It might require further legislation to convince the secrecy-minded bureaucrats that
Congress meant what it said 5 years ago when it passed the first
Freedom of Information Act.
It will require legislation, I believe, to straighten out the
secrecy mess which has been created in the name of national
defense.
The thrust of the movement for reform was in the House;
hearings on H. R. 5425 and H. R. 4960 were opened by Chairman
Moorhead on May 2, 1973.181 Testimony before the House Subcommittee criticized the executive departments and agencies for
failing to cooperate in implementation of the Act.'8 2 The basic
complaint was that top administrators had "failed to push full
implementation of the Act, while middle-level officials had no
incentive to abandon past habits of caution. The safe course continued to be 'when in doubt, deny.' 183 The prevailing judicial
interpretation of the national security exemption had rendered
the Act practically useless as a means of access to improperly
classified information and to information for which classification
was no longer justified. The decision in Mink was seen by many
as one of the major obstacles to full implementation of the congressional intent.'84
Those opposing amendment, in the main representatives of
Problems Involving Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of InformationAct). The subcommittee issued a unanimous report recommending measures to strengthen the Freedom of
Information Act. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, Administration of the Freedom of Information
Act, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also Hearings on S.1125, supra note 153.
180. Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices, supra note
179, pt. 7, at 2284-85.
181. Hearings on H.R. 5425 & H.R. 4960 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations,93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
182. Id. at 93, 344-47. See also Engel, InformationDisclosure Policiesand Practices
of FederalAdministrativeAgencies, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 14 (1973); Gianella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A ProposalforUniform Regulations,
23 An,L. REv. 217 (1971); Nader, Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies,
5 HARV. Civ. RiC, Ts-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1970).
183. Clark, supra note 81, at 763.
184. For example, Senator Edmund Muskie, who sponsored the amendment in the
Senate, observed that the change was required because of the Supreme Court's decision
in Mink. See 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 529, 538-39 n.55 (1973).
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administrative agencies and executive departments, argued that
the Mink decision was constitutionally warranted, and that the
Act was the maximum permissible intrusion upon the executive's
privilege to withhold information. The Justice Department
quoted with approval the Court's statement in Mink that judicial
review may not extend to "[e]xecutive security classifications
.... at the insistence of anyone who might seek to question
them."'86 The Department argued that "the courts, as they themselves have recognized, are not equipped [for such review]," '
and that the new executive order provided adequate sanction for
"' The Department
abuse. 87
of Defense suggested an alternative
approach. Fearing that new amendments would be "interpreted
as an encouragement to the courts to second-guess security classi' 8 it
fication decisions made pursuant to an Executive Order,'
urged Congress to'89
simply permit the court, where it has some reason to doubt the
validity of an affidavit supporting a security classification, to
examine the classified record solely for the purpose of determining that the authorized official of the Executive Branch has
exercised his classification authority in good faith and in basic
conformity with the criteria of the Executive Order.
This would have placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff seeking disclosure.
H. R. 12,471, amending the Freedom of Information Act, 9 '
was ultimately passed over the objections of the Departments of
Justice and State, and over President Ford's veto. 9 ' The amendments effected two major changes in this area. The first, removing the bar imposed by Mink, provided that a court reviewing a
claim of exemption "may examine the contents of . . . agency
185. Letter from the Department of Justice to Representative Chet Holifield, Chairman of the House Committee on Government Operations, Feb. 20, 1974, U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 6279 (1974), quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 82 (1973).
186. Letter from the Department of Justice, supra note 185, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6279.
187. Id. at 6281.
188. Letter from L. Niederlehner, Acting General Counsel of the Department of Defense to Representative Chet Holifield, Chairman of the House Committee on Government
Operations, Feb. 20, 1974, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6285 (1974).
189. Id.
190. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, amending 5 U.S.C. §
552 (1971) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 1975)).
191. Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments, Oct. 17, 1974, 10 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Docs. 1318 (1974). See generally N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1974, at 21, col. 3.
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The second was a restatement of the

national security exemption. It now exempts from the Act's dis'
closure requirements any matters which are: 93
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant
to such Executive order ....
The House Report which accompanied the bill specifies the
legislative intent:' 94
The first of these amendments would insert an additional'
clause in section 552(a)(3) to make it clear that court review
may include examination of the contents of any agency records
in camera to determine if such records or any part thereof shall
be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in section
552(b). This language authorizes the court to go behind the
official notice of classification and examine the contents of the
records themselves.
The second amendment aimed at court review is a rewording of section 552(b)(1) .

. .

. The change from the language

pertaining to information "required" to be classified by Executive order to information which is "authorized" to be classified
under the "criteria" of an Executive order means that the court,
if it chooses to undertake review of a classification determination, including examination of the records in camera, may look
at the reasonableness or propriety of the determination to classify the records under the terms of the Executive order.
Thus, the amendments were a major change in the law. There
was no reference in the House Report, however, to a possible
conflict between the scope of judicial review authorized and executive privilege. The Report simply noted that the witnesses
who testified as representatives of the executive branch had
opposed the original Act and were similarly opposed to the new
amendments.'9

The Senate debates were an interesting piece of the legisla192. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1975).
193. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1975).
194. H.R. REP. No. 876, supra note 52, at 7, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6273 (1974)
(emphasis in original).
195. Id. at 10, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6275.
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tive history. The Senate's version of the amendments had provided that upon submission of an agency head's affidavit196
certifying that he has personally examined the documents withheld and has determined after such examination that they
should be withheld. . . the court shall sustain such withholding
unless, following its in camera examination, it finds the withholding is without a reasonable basis ....
Such a provision, similar to that suggested by the Defense Department, would have shifted the burden from the agency to the
petitioner who requests security-related information.'9 7 The proposal was never adopted by the full Senate.
The only indication of congressional intent to limit the power
of the courts to conduct full-scale review of agency classification
appeared in the Conference Report which accompanied the final
version of the bill. 118 The Report reiterated that the amendment
set aside the holding in Mink and allowed in camera review of
classified documents to determine whether they were "'in fact,
properly classified' pursuant to both procedural and substantive
criteria contained in [the] Executive order." 9 The Report cautioned, however, that because of the extreme sensitivity of the
material involved, deference should be given to executive deter200
minations in this area:
Before the court orders incamera inspection, the Government
should be given the opportunity to establish by means of testimony or detailed affidavits that the documents are clearly exempt from disclosure.
20 1
The conferees also noted that:

196. S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 120 CONG. REc. 9311 (daily ed. May 30,
1974).
197. It has been suggested that the reason behind this proposed change was that
Senator Kennedy, who authored the draft and who was steering it through the
Senate, went along with this language to keep peace within a coalition which
included a number of conservatives whose support was necessary to avoid a
showdown over the [proposed] provisions which imposed sanctions against
officials who unreasonably withheld information.
Clark, supra note 81, at 757.
198. H. REP. No. 93-1380 (Conference Report No. 1200), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6285 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report],
accompanying ultimate passage of H.R. 12471.
199. Id. at 12, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6290.
200. Id. at 9, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6288.
201. Id. at 12, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6290.
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[Tihe Executive departments responsible for national defense
and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse effects might occur as a result of public disclosure of a
particular classified record. Accordingly, the conferees expect
that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations in section 552(b) (1) cases under the Freedom of Information law, will
accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning
the details of the classified status of the disputed record.
The full meaning of this caveat is not readily apparent. How
is the "substantial weight" accorded to an agency affidavit to be
reconciled with the fact that the Act places on the agency the
burden of proving that information has been "'properly classified' pursuant to both procedural and substantive criteria contained in [the] Executive order"?" 2 The Conference Report did
affirm that "[t]he burden remains on the Government under
this law."2 3 It is likely that the conferees merely intended to
emphasize that in camera review of the substantive accuracy of
a classification is merely an option at the court's disposal, and
may not be necessary where the Government can show that docu2 4 Such an interprements are "clearly exempt from disclosure.""
tation is consistent with the purposes of the amendments and of
the original Act.
Preclusion of in camera inspection might occur when the
material requested is so critically sensitive, either to military
preparedness or a delicate facet of our foreign relations, that disclosure to the court and a full-scale hearing would subject the
material to an unwarranted and unnecessary risk. An example
would be a request for State or Defense Department codes. In
such a case, however, the executive would doubtless challenge in
camera review on constitutional grounds-as violative of the separation of powers doctrine which gives the executive authority
over foreign and military affairs."0 5 It is thus possible that the
quoted passage in the Conference Report is an oblique recognition
of the limitations which the doctrine of executive privilege places
upon the congressional scheme. It is unfortunate that courts may
arguably be able to choose between the version of the legislativd
history suggested here and a version which considers the Confer202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 9, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6287.
Id., U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6288 (emphasis added).
See Clark, supra note 81, at 755.
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ence Report as intending the courts to sustain withholding whenever there is a reasonable basis shown.
President Ford, in vetoing the amendments, 2 6 emphasized
that the judicial review provisions could conceivably violate the
executive's privilege, and as such were unconstitutional. In doing
so, he argued that:2 '
As the legislation now stands, a determination by the Secretary
of Defense that disclosure of a document would endanger our
national security would, even though reasonable, have to be
overturned by a district judge who thought the plaintiff's position just as reasonable.
0'28
This, he contended, "would violate constitutional principles.
As previously noted,2 0 however, a judicial check upon the propriety of actions taken by the executive is not unconstitutional,
and may in some cases be constitutionally required. All the Act's
new language does is to "require the executive department to
comply with its own rules as set out by executive order and...
give the court the authority to decide whether there has been such
compliance .
-"20...
The President and the Congress have constitutional authority to establish standards for, and regulate the disclosure of,
national security-related information;"' Congress has chosen at
this time, however, to leave the determination of the standards
to the executive. By permitting the courts to review classification
determinations pursuant to the executive's standards, Congress
has not invested the judiciary with a power which usurps an
executive function. Congress has simply subjected the executive
branch to the accountability contemplated by the constitutional
system of government. The result should be the prevention of a
runaway system of classification. As administrative officials must
now be prepared to defend their actions in court, a giant step has
been taken toward compelling the bureaucracy to honor the public's statutory right to know, and insuring more responsible determinations of what the public does not have a right to know.
206. Veto of Freedom of Information Act Amendments, Oct. 17, 1974, 10 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Docs. 1318 (1974).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See notes 149-54 supra and accompanying text.
210. Clark, supra note 81, at 754.
211. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973); see Henkin, supra note 12, at 280 n.29.
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Implementation of the judicial review mandated by the
amendment, however, raises significant practical difficulties.
Congress in effect incorporated the executive orders into the 1974
Act and a court must deterinine whether a challenged classification meets the standards of the appropriate order. The orders are
generalized prescriptions stated in terms of vague concepts which
present problems to a court charged with giving them practical
effect." ' The difficulties are compounded because neither the statutory language, nor the legislative history, are clear on what
standard of proof is to be imposed. The language of the Confer2 3
ence Report itself injects a degree of uncertainty on this issue.
As courts have done in other areas where they are authorized to
review the legal basis for administrative action, they should, however, be able to develop a feel for the sensitive balancing which
agency personnel must make in determining whether to classify.
While in many cases the agency's judgment will prevail, the submission of administrative determinations to judicial scrutiny
should in itself have a moderating influence.
Judicial review may not actually be the ultimate answer to
the problem of reducing the great backlog of erroneously classified information. It has been argued that this burden should utlimately rest with Congress.2 14 At present, however, it is the duty

of the courts to prevent administrative abuse of the classification
212. In Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941), the Supreme Court defined
"national defense" as "a generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military
and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness." Gorin has
been severely criticized in that "[tihere are innumerable documents referring to the
military or naval establishments, or related activities of national preparedness, which
threaten no conceivable security or other governmental interest. . . ... Nimmer, National
Security Secrets v. FreeSpeech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STN.
L. REV. 311, 326 (1974). In recent years economic and environmental information have
become increasingly important to the national security and welfare, even displacing the
traditional military conception of what is vital to the national defense. Is such information
circumscribed by the "national security" concept? One suggestion is that the standard
for disclosure should be that upon release of the information in question, serious injury to
the state is both likely and imminent. See id. at 332. See also Edgar & Schmidt, The
EspionageStatutes and Publicationof DefenseInformation, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973);
Note, The Freedom of Information Act-The Parametersof the Exemptions, 62 GEO. L.J.
177 (1973).
213. See notes 198-205 supra and accompanying text.
214. Henkin, supra note 12, at 279-80; see S. 393, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The
bill would have established a Joint Committee in Congress in order to "supervise. . . the
protection and disclosure of information relating to [national defense and foreign] policies [of the United States] . . . ." Id. § 4(b)(2). The Joint Committee would have been
empowered to "direct the public disclosure" of such information. Id.
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system to the extent possible within the limits imposed by the
adversary system of justice.
The JudicialResponse
Although, the amendments seem to have had some salutary
effect upon the practices of the administrative agencies," 5 the
only- decisions dealing with the revised national security exemption to date have interpreted it in a manner not fully consistent
with the policies behind the amendments. In Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. v. Colby,"' the Fourth Circuit decided a sequel to the case
of United States v. Marchetti,in which the court had issued an
injunction prohibiting Marchetti's public disclosure of classified
information acquired by him during his employment with the
Central Intelligence Agency, thereby enforcing his contract of
secrecy with the agency. 2 7 In the earlier decision, Marchetti had
been ordered to submit any material intended for publication for
review by the agency. After submission of his manuscript, the
CIA specified 168 unpublishable items said to contain classified
information. An action was filed by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., the
intended publisher, Marchetti, and John Marks, a former employee of the State Department who was also bound by the
agency's decision, seeking an order which would permit the publication of these deleted items.1 8
215. "[Pirodded by suits under the Act," the agencies made "three highly publicized disclosures" revealing material "viewed as both sensitive and embarrassing." Clark,
supra note 81, at 750. The Atomic Energy Commission released documents that "it had
suppressed over a ten-year period, setting out opinions of staff scientists that a major
reactor accident might kill up to 45,000 people and create a disaster area the size of
Pennsylvania." Id. at 750-51. The Department of the Army agreed to release the Peers
Report, which described "the details of the My Lai massacre and. . . the failure of high
ranking officers to face up to their responsibilities." Id. at 751. "[T]he Internal Revenue
Service surrendered to the Tax Reform Research Group memoranda, letters and other
documents describing the activities of an investigative group of the IRS which had since
1969 been keeping 'leftist organizations' under surveillance." Id. More recently, the FBI,
under pressure from a lawsuit brought on behalf of the Socialist Workers Party, released
documents which revealed that the party had been the subject of intensive investigation
by the bureau for the past 20 years. Washington Post, July 17, 1975, at 1, col. 1. Similarly,
the Justice Department has released 20,000 pages of documents concerning the
investigation of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. The couple's sons, Robert and Michael Meeropol, had filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain all the Government's
files on their parents' case. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1975, at 61, col. 1.
216. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
217. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); see note 108 supra
and accompanying text.
218. While the action was not brought under -the Freedom of Information Act, its
disclosure requirements were relevant in view of the court's holding that "[t]hese plain-
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The district court limited its decision, reached prior to the
amendment of the Freedom of Information Act, to the issue of
whether the agency had satisfactorily demonstrated that the
items sought to be withheld had been classified pursuant to executive order. A strict standard of proof was applied, however, the
Court holding that information2 19
is not classified until a classifying officer makes a conscious
determination that the governmental interest in secrecy outweighs a general policy of disclosure and applies a label of 'Top
Secret' or 'Secret' or 'Confidential' to the information in question.
On appeal, Chief Judge Haynsworth took cognizance of the
new amendments, and stated that "the Freedom of Information
Act as now amended clearly provides for judicial review of questions of classifiability," and that "any citizen now can compel the
production of information actually classified if its classification
was not authorized by the Executive Order. ' 20 The court remanded the case for an appropriate determination of this issue.
It then reviewed the lower court's determination on the issue of
whether the material had in fact been classified, and concluded
that "the burden of proof imposed upon the defendants to establish classification was far too stringent ..
"1
2.
The court ordered new findings of fact, substituting for the lower court's standard of proof, a "presumption of regularity"2 2 under which there
is "no room for speculation that information which the district
court can recognize as proper for top secret classification was not
classified at all by the official who placed the 'Top Secret' legend
' '2
on the document.
In applying a presumption of regularity to classification issues, the Fourth Circuit acted in disregard of the stated premises
tiffs should not be denied the right to publish information which any citizen could compel
the CIA to produce and, after production, could publish." Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby,
509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
219. Id. at 1366 (court of appeals characterizing the district court holding).
220. Id. at 1367.
221. Id. at 1370.
222. Id. at 1368.
223. Id. The court also relied on the presumption of regularity in deciding that vague
testimony by deputy directors of the CIA on the probable time of classification was
sufficient to prove that classification occurred before Marchetti's employment had terminated. The presumption dispelled the need for any testimony by the classifying officer on
this issue. Id. at 1369.
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of the Freedom of Information Act. While it is generally recognized that a "presumption of regularity supports the official acts
of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties, ' 2 4 the Freedom of Information Act abrogated the
presumption in the area of government-held information. The
legislative reports accompanying the bill specifically state, with
regard to information withheld pursuant to executive classification, that it is the intention of the Act to place the burden of proof
squarely on the Government. 22 The presumption is now one of
irregularity with respect to agency determinations to withhold
information from the public.
The other decision to date dealing with the disclosure of
national security information under the amended Act is that of a
district court in Theriault v. United States.2 1 The survivors of a
United States Air Force civilian employee killed in the crash of
an Air Force EC-135 brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act for a complete copy of the Air Force accident report for
use in a pending wrongful death action. The court relied on executive privilege to preclude disclosure. 271 Finding that the report did
not fall under the national security exemption since it had never
been classified pursuant to the procedures outlined in Executive
Order 11,652, the court held that "[t]he filing of a claim of
224. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); accord,
FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965); Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir.
1959) where the court stated:
[W]e will indulge in the regularity of the [selective service] board proceedings,
i.e., 'that all necessary prerequisites to the validity of official action are presumed to have been complied with, and that where the contrary is asserted it
must be affirmatively shown' [citations omitted].
Id. at 380.
225. See, e.g., Conference Report, supra note 198, at 9, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 6287-88.
226. 395 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
227. An alternate basis for the decision was reliance on equity principles. The district
court adhered to an earlier decision of the Ninth Circuit in the same case. Theriault v.
United States, 503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[w]e realize that a given agency might
fail to show a specific exemption protecting a given record and yet in good faith claim that
dire adverse potentialities will occur and result from a disclosure of a given record").
Courts are sharply divided on whether equitable jurisdiction is available to deny disclosure of materials on grounds other than those specified by the Act. Compare Rose v.
Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269-70 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds,
44 U.S.L.W. 4503 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1976), with Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.D.C.
1971). But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (Supp. IV, 1975) (limiting withholding to the exemptions
"specifically stated" in the Act).
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Executive Privilege . . . invokes the Court's equitable powers
and requires the Court to balance the needs of the parties in
addition to considering whether the documents in question are
specifically exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. [Citations omitted.] '228 The court found that

"[tihe disclosure of the withheld portions of the aircraft accident
report would adversely affect the Air Force's Aviation Safety Pro-

gram, which has a direct bearing on the national security of this
country." '29 Disclosure of the report was therefore denied.
The question which Theriaultraises is whether the doctrine

of executive privilege is a substitute for the national security
exemption of the Act and is to be used whenever an agency de-

sires to prevent disclosure but fails to meet the requirements
which the Act imposes. To answer affirmatively would be to elim-

inate any need for the statutory exemption and to vitiate the Act.
Theriault, in "balancing the competing interests," and noting

that "the documents in question would clearly fall within the
spirit if not the letter of the exemption, "230 adopts this untenable
position, and should be reversed. 3'
228. Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637, 641 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The opinion
states that had the report been classified pursuant to Executive Order 11,652, the Air
Force would have "thereby precluded any further proceedings by this Court . . ." Id.
at 641, citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973). Judge Hauk was apparently unaware
that the decision in Mink was specifically overruled by the amendments to the Freedom
of Information Act.
229. Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637, 642 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The court
reached this conclusion by noting that
[i]n order to insure that all possible causes of an accident are identified and
considered and all corrective actions are weighed, investigators operate [and
witnesses testify] with the understanding that their deliberations and their
reports [and their testimony] will not be released outside of the Air Force or
used for any purpose other than aviation safety.
Id. at 640. The court reasoned that the "keystone" of the Air Force Aviation Safety
Program is the "ability of the Air Force to obtain all available information pertaining to
an accident," and as the program is vital to the national security, release of the report
would be detrimental to national security interests. Id. at 641.
230. Id. at 642.
231. A very similar fact pattern was presented to another court in Rabbitt v. Department of Air Force, 401 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court held that transcripts of
witnesses' statements before the Air Force Investigation Board were protected from disclosure by a qualified claim of executive privilege extending to "documents which are integral
to an appropriate exercise of the executive's decisional and policy-making functions" and
"intra-govemmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated [citations omitted]." Id. at 1208-09. See also Brockway v. Department of Air
Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975). It thus seems that, at least insofar as air crash
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Theriault raises an issue discussed by Professor Davis in his
analysis of the 1966 Act: can it be said that 32
the statute defines the national interest or the public interest
under the doctrine of executive privilege, and that the constitutional law and the common law of executive privilege are embodied in the statutory law, which then would become the foundation for all law of disclosure?
He concluded that the Act permitted no such conclusion and
predicted that "[i]nstead of building on the statute, the courts
will build on three foundations-the statute, the public interest
according to the doctrine of Executive privilege, and equity traditions.

1

33

Professor Davis' prediction may have come to fruition

notwithstanding the amendment of the Act in 1974.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite their disappointing interpretations of the new
amendments, it is to be hoped that courts will ultimately adopt
a more liberal attitude toward requests for information of a national security character-one which is more consistent with
democratic theory, first amendment rights, and the Freedom of
Information Act. Thomas Jefferson once asked "whether peace
is best preserved by giving energy to the government, or information to the people .... ",234 He answered that the latter "is the
most certain, and the most legitimate engine of government." 23 5
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Alfred A. Knopf v.
Colby.26 By so doing, it let stand a lower court decision which
placed a greater premium on the executive's right to secrecy than
on the public's right to know. The judicial branch should be
aware that under the statutory scheme it is the courts' power of
review which stands as the sole limitation upon an executive
branch infused with the notion that it is privileged to withhold
almost any information it pleases. Vietnam and Watergate
accident reports are concerned, courts have managed to bypass the Freedom of Information Act and deny disclosure.
232. Davis, supra note 61, at 803.
233. Id. at 803-04.
234. 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Memorial ed. 1903), as quoted in Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 641 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
237. The danger of abuse of the system of classification was underscored by Justice
Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 641-42 (1972):
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teach that it is impossible for citizens to ascertain whether those
who have been charged with the protection of the national interest have acted responsibly unless there is access to such information as will facilitate public scrutiny of official action. Justice
Stewart made this point in his concurring opinion in the

PentagonPapers case: 38
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present
in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint
upon executive policy and power in the area of national defense
and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in
an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here
protect the values of democratic government ...
I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly
effective internal security system would be the maximum
possible disclosure recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.

Mark S. Adler
fA]s has been revealed by such exposes as the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai
massacres, the Gulf of Tonkin "incident," and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the
Government usually suppresses damaging news but highlights favorable news.
In this filtering process the secrecy stamp is the officials' tool of suppression and
it has been used to withhold information which in "99 1/2%" of the cases would
present no danger to national security.
238. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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